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1. Introduction
In an intriguing work on intractable conflict between nations and groups,
Thomas Scheff theorizes that a major underlying cause of such conflict is to be
found in cycles of humiliation and rage. Toward the end of his book Bloody
Revenge, Scheff suggests that acknowledgement of feelings may have an
important role to play in the resolution of such conflicts. He mentions apologies
as a form of acknowledgement and suggests that a greater acknowledgement
of human interdependence and less denial would have positive effects on
some ongoing conflicts. (Scheff 1994) Joseph Montville, director of a program
on preventive diplomacy, also claims that acknowledgement of wrongdoing,
often expressed through formal apology, is profoundly important for the healing
of victims and their reconciliation with perpetrators. (Montville in Henderson
1996) Michael Ignatieff makes similar claims about apology and
acknowledgement at the end of The Warrior’s Honour, his recent book about
the horrifying breakdown of moral codes characteristic of ethnic violence,
especially in Yugoslavia. Ignatieff boldly claims that had President Tudjman of
Croatia officially apologized to Serbs for the violence committed by fascists
Ustache during World War II, the fears of Serbs living within Croatia would
have been soothed and the brutal Balkan wars of the nineties would not have
happened. The apology would have served to acknowledge past wrongdoing
and suffering and announce a break from it. (Ignatieff 1997) In her recent work,
Between Vengeance and Forgiveness, Martha Minow also emphasizes the
importance of acknowledgement of past wrongs, when discussing trials, truth
commissions, reparations, and apologies as different ways of responding to
and attempting to recover from gross human rights violations.(Minow 1998)
In the introduction to his book, A Miracle, A Universe, which discusses Latin
American experience in dealing with torturers after democratization, Lawrence
Weschler describes a conference at which participants struggled to come to
terms with the concept of acknowledgement. Weschler says:
Fragile, tentative democracies time and again hurl themselves
toward an abyss, struggling over this issue of truth. It’s a
mysteriously powerful, almost magical notion, because often
everyone already knows the truth—everyone knows who the
torturers were and what they did, the torturers know that everyone
knows, and everyone knows that they know. Why, then, this need to
risk everything to render that knowledge explicit? The participants
....worried this question around the table several times -distinctions here seemed particularly slippery and elusive -- until
Thomas Nagel, a professor of philosophy and law at New York

University, almost stumbled upon an answer. "It’s the difference,"
Nagel said haltingly, "between knowledge and acknowledgement.
It’s what happens and can only happen to knowledge when it
becomes officially sanctioned, when it is made part of the public
cognitive scene." Yes, several of the panelists agreed. And that
transformation, offered another participant, is sacramental.
(Weschler 1990:4)
The acknowledgement of past wrongs and those who had suffered from them
was a primary goal of South Africa’s Truth and Reconciliation Commission. In
his introduction to the Commission’s final report, Archbishop Desmond Tutu
alluded to Ariel Dorfman’s well-known work Death and the Maiden, which
deals with a torture victim’s temptation to enact revenge on the man who
tortured her. She has him tied up when he admits that what he did was wrong.
Then "his admission restores her dignity and her identity. Her experience is
confirmed as real and not illusory, and her sense of self is affirmed," Tutu says.
Later in this report, in a chapter explaining the mandate of the Commission,
there are further references to acknowledgement. A central purpose of the
TRC was to "acknowledge the tragedy of human suffering wherever it has
occurred," whether victims were black or white. It was a central purpose of the
TRC to "restore the human and civil dignity of victims by granting them an
opportunity to relate their own accounts of the violations of which they are the
victims and by recommending reparation measures in respect of those
violations." A fundamental assumption underlying the work of the Commission
and especially that of its victim hearings, was the idea that when victims were
provided with an opportunity to tell their own story before a state-authorized
public body in their own language and their own words, their testimony would
restore the human dignity so jeopardized by the apartheid system. Poignantly
describing the fundamental lack of acknowledgement of blacks as persons of
dignity under the apartheid regime, Mtutuzeli Matshoba said, "For neither am I
a man in the eyes of the law, nor am I am man in the eyes of my fellow man."
The work of the TRC was based on the assumption that there is a potentially
healing power in being able to tell one’s story, in having the importance of that
story recognized by a public body, and in being thereby publicly acknowledged
as one wronged, with a credible and important story to tell. As human beings
with stories to tell, many thousands of South Africans appeared before the
Commission where they were respectfully listened to and treated as human
beings with dignity and meriting respect. Some linked the work of the
Commission to an African concept known as ‘Ubuntu.’ The saying ‘umuntu
ngumuntu ngabuntu’ means that people are people only through other people.
For many people, being denigrated and disrespected by others meant
scarcely maintaining status as human beings. In such cases acknowledgement
may be expected to have tremendous power and an impact both on the
healing of human beings wounded by past abuse and on their potential
reconciliation with those who have wounded them.
Though widely criticized within South Africa, the TRC has to many foreigners

seemed to be an inspiring, enormous, and sustained effort to deal with a past
of overwhelming brutality. Through its efforts, South Africans were led to
confront and address the feelings of victims and perpetrators in an attempt to
escape from the vicious cycle of history in which those who have been
oppressed seem so easily and so naturally to become oppressors in their own
right. Many who supported boycotts and sanctions against apartheid South
Africa during the eighties are likely to take a special interest in this
Commission and its work.
But it is not necessary to look as far as South Africa to find statements about
the importance of acknowledgement. They are to be found in the Canadian
Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples, issued in 1996. I quote from the
first volume.
(W)hile we assume the role of defender of human rights in the
international community, we retain, in our conception of Canada’s
origins and make-up, the remnants of colonial attitudes of cultural
superiority that do violence to the Aboriginal peoples to whom they
are directed. Restoring Aboriginal nations to a place of honour in
our shared history, and recognizing their continuing presence as
collectives participating in Canadian life, are therefore fundamental
to the changes we propose. (Report of Royal Commission on
Aboriginal People, 1996: 5)
In its survey of relations between aboriginal peoples and those who came after
them to settle in their territory and found the nation of Canada, the report notes
that official Canadian history tends to ignore and negate aboriginal people’s
view of themselves and their encounter with settler society. It calls for
acknowledgement of Aboriginal peoples and cultures, the wrongs done to
them, and their contribution to Canadian history and society.
(B)efore Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal people can get on with the
work of reconciliation, a great cleansing of the wounds of the past
must take place. The government of Canada, on behalf of the
Canadian people, must acknowledge and express deep regret for
the spiritual, cultural, economic and physical violence visited upon
Aboriginal people, as individuals and as nations, in the past. And
they must make a public commitment that such violence will never
again be permitted or supported. (Report of Royal Commission on
Aboriginal People, 1996: 7-8)
Later in the context of a discussion of compulsory relocations of many native
communities, the Commission called again for acknowledgement, seeing it as
highly significant for the healing of native peoples and their potential
reconciliation with mainstream Canadian society.
The commission is of the opinion that governments ought to
acknowledge that the practice of relocating Aboriginal
communities, where these relocations failed to adhere to the

standards we recommend, has contributed to the violation of
Aboriginal people’s rights as human beings . . . many Aboriginal
communities continue to feel a deep sense of grievance about
relocation. Healing will begin in earnest only when governments
acknowledge that relocation practices, however, well-intentioned,
contributed to a denial of human rights. Acknowledging
responsibility assists in the necessary healing process because it
creates room for dialogue about the reasons for relocation and the
fact that these reasons were often based on ignorance and
erroneous assumptions about Aboriginal people and their identity.
Aboriginal people need to know that governments accept
responsibility for relocations and recognize their effects.
Recognition and responsibility are the necessary first steps to
overcoming the many adverse effects of relocations. (Report of
Royal Commission on Aboriginal People, 1996: 513)
The Canadian Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples cited the Canadian
Human Rights Commission, which said in 1991 and reiterated in 1994 that the
situation of aboriginal peoples is the single most important human rights issue
confronting Canada. The Human Rights Commission recommended
government apologies for various aspects of native/white relations including
relocations, the appallingly brutal system of residential schools, the treatment
of veterans, and the exploitative failure to take treaty commitments seriously. It
called for these apologies as a form of acknowledgement and a step toward
compensation for "the affront to dignity, self-respect and self-determination"
implicit in many relocations. Apologies would serve a broad educative function,
acknowledge serious affronts to human dignity, and express commitment and
hope that the mistakes of the past would not be committed again. The report
cites native veterans as desiring, more than anything else, recognition from the
government of their contribution, through memorials in their communities.
The Commission found that in many fundamental aspects, relations with
mainstream (largely white) Canadian society has been disastrous for native
peoples and should be a source of outrage and shame to non-native
Canadians. The system of residential schools, in particular, has done
incredible damage, resulting in
loss of life, denigration of culture, destruction of self-respect and
self-esteem, rupture of families, impact of these traumas on
succeeding generations, and the enormity of the cultural
triumphalism that lay behind the enterprise – will deeply disturb
anyone who allows this story to seep into their consciousness and
recognizes that these policies were perpetrated by Canadians no
better or worse intentioned, no better or worse educated than we
are today. (Report of Royal Commission on Aborigional People:
602)
The Report calls for respect for native Canadians as individuals, and for

respect for their cultures and contributions to Canadian history and society. In
short, the Commission calls repeatedly for acknowledgement of the dignity
and worth of native peoples and the wrongs done to them by governments and
the broader society over several centuries.
2. The Concept of Acknowledgement
The concept of acknowledgement strikes me as a fascinating one that merits
more attention than it has received and more than I can give it here. I
concentrate particularly on acknowledgement in the context of serious
wrongdoing and especially on its relevance for issues of reconciliation
between individuals and between groups. These are contexts in which selfdeception on an individual or collective level is open to serious moral criticism
because in effect we choose to ignore serious harms to other people. Lest I be
taken to castigate anyone in particular, let me say that I suspect that most of us
find ourselves in several roles with regard to the commission of serious
wrongs. We are victims, or affiliates of victims, of some wrongs; perpetrators,
or affiliates of perpetrators, of others; and bystanders with regard to others. In
the Canadian situation, for instance, one might be a Holocaust survivor or child
of a survivor, in this respect a victim, and nevertheless a beneficiary and,
through affiliation with church or state institutions, beneficiary or perpetrator so
far as Canadian wrongs against aboriginal peoples are concerned. So far as
victims and perpetrators are concerned, my position is similar to that of Vaclav
Havel who said (though for slightly different reasons) that inside each person
there is a line between the oppressed and the oppressor. There are no
absolute victims and no absolute oppressors, on Havel’s account. Rather,
within every person there are elements of each.
There is little written in either psychology or philosophy about
acknowledgement as such, and the conception of acknowledgement seems
abstract and even rather vague. We can see from the statements cited above
a widely held conviction that acknowledgement is something of importance in
the context of addressing wrongdoing. And yet at the conference Weschler
described, participants arrived at the notion of acknowledgement only with
difficulty, and were hard-pressed to articulate what it means and to differentiate
it from knowledge. We have seen from key statements an expressed
conviction that acknowledgement matters a great deal to wronged peoples,
and that it is an important first stage in the healing of victims of wrongdoing,
and a move toward their reconciliation with those who have harmed them.
I thus arrive at the questions which set the theme for this paper. What is
acknowledgement? And why it is important?
Acknowledgement is not the same thing as knowledge, because we may know
things that we do not acknowledge. A woman may know that she is shorttempered and prone to yell at her children without ever acknowledging to them
that she has these failings. They may know it without ever expressing it to her,
and so on. A man may know that he is 82 years old and people 82 years old
have a short time left to live; thus in some sense he knows that he has a short

future; -- and yet he may not acknowledge this. That is to say, he may not admit
it to himself, spell it out to himself, avow it as an aspect of his identity, or admit
it to other people. He has chosen to ignore or deny the fact of his age and not
take it into account in when planning and conducting his relationships and
practical affairs. Though he has the evidence and intellectual capacity for this
knowledge, he does not articulate to himself what he knows; he does not avow
or admit this to himself or others. That is to say, he does not acknowledge it.
Rather, he is in a state of denial or avoidance with regard to it.
At the conference described by Weschler, participants discussed a situation in
which people knew that certain others had been torturers under a military
regime; yet that fact was not acknowledged – that is to say, it was not openly
admitted and discussed. Acknowledging it would mean spelling it out, publicly
stating that these were facts – and by implication, taking some action in the
light of those facts.
Much of what we know, we also acknowledge, or would be willing to
acknowledge. But some of what we know or are in a position to know, we do
not acknowledge and would not be willing to acknowledge. Broadly speaking
the difference between knowledge and acknowledgement seems to lie in a
spelling out, articulation -- an explicit verbal spelling out or other form of
marked awareness. The mother who knows that she is sometimes badtempered to her children acknowledges this to them if she tells them so,
perhaps saying something like, "I know I’ve been crabby this past week, and
I’ve been yelling at you, and I’m sorry…" She recognizes her emotions and
behavior, puts that recognition into words, and expresses it to others. She
articulates to herself and admits to others that the irritable behavior has really
been part of herself. Those who have been hurt by her behavior are likely to be
reassured by her admission, or acknowledgement, that this is her failing, by
implication not to be blamed solely on her children.
The example of the irritable mother may suggest why we may expect
acknowledgement to make a powerful difference in certain cases of
wrongdoing. Only a person who acknowledges her irritability is likely to
overcome it, and the implication of saying she is sorry is that she is going to try
to change. Acknowledging will surely be a necessary first step in such a case.
In the treatment of alcoholics by Alcoholics Anonymous, one begins by saying
"I am ….., and I am an alcoholic." To address and attempt to resolve a
problem, one must first acknowledge that one has it, which in this case means
admitting explicitly and publicly that this problem is attached to oneself, part of
oneself, part of who one is.
It would seem that in such cases acknowledgement is knowledge with a kind of
avowal which amounts to a spelling out or marking of what we know. A person
who acknowledges something admits or allows that that something is attached
in some way to himself or herself. Typically we acknowledge or admit things to
others, but in order to do so sincerely, we must first acknowledge them to
ourselves. There are many ways of failing to acknowledge something that is

wrong. We may re-describe it, seeking to prove to ourselves that it is
something other than it is; we may deny it; we may emotionally detach
ourselves from it; we may ignore it; or we may deceive ourselves about it. Here
I concentrate on two forms of avoidance integral to the others: self-deception,
and ignoring.
One opposite to acknowledgement is self-deception. A person may be an
alcoholic, may have considerable evidence that he is an alcoholic, sufficient
evidence that were it to apply to anyone else, he would readily conclude that
that person was an alcoholic, may even experience serious family and working
problems as a result of his drinking -- and yet may not be prepared to admit to
himself or anyone else that he is an alcoholic. He may ignore relevant facts
because ‘alcoholic’ is not a label he is willing to accept as describing himself.
Such a man can be said to be deceiving himself about his alcoholism. He is in
a position to know, and in some sense even does know, and take account of
the fact, that he is an alcoholic. Yet he does not acknowledge this. He knows
that he drinks before lunch, knows that he feels miserable if he does not drink.
Yet he ignores the obvious implications of these facts.
In his 1969 book Self-Deception, Herbert Fingarette used the notions of
disavowal and lack of acknowledgement as the basis for an account of selfdeception. He said that the self-deceiver is engaged in the world in a way he is
not prepared to accept as part of his personal identity and thus does not spell
out, admit or avow. There is a gap between the way he is engaged in the world
and the story he tells himself and others about himself. Fingarette said:
A person may avow or acknowledge as his an action, a
feeling, an emotion, a perception, a belief, an attitude,
a concern, an aim, or a reason. In avowing them as his,
a person is identifying himself as one who feels,
suffers, perceives, believes, etc, thus and so. … In
speaking of avowal and acknowledgement, we are
concerned with an acceptance by the person which is
constitutive, which is de jure in its force, which
establishes something as his for him.
We might acknowledge or fail to acknowledge such aspects of ourselves or
our societies as habits, traits, policies, conditions, or actions. Fingarette spoke
of acknowledging, or failing to acknowledge, engagements in the world.
Engagements that we are not prepared to acknowledge are those which we
are not willing to accept as part of ourselves, personal frailties or
inadequacies, or – most pertinently for the present topic, acts of wrongdoing
for which we have shared responsibility or with which we have been
significantly affiliated.
In a later paper on self-deception, Fingarette takes a slightly different position.
He explains that as the mind normally works, we attend to some aspects of the
world while not attending to others. For example, a person who is writing a

letter by hand will attend to what he is saying, but not to the way in which his
fingers are holding the pen. Yet though he is not attending to the position of his
fingers, he can intelligently take account of that and adapt their position if his
fingers slip.
(M)y attention is focused on my thoughts at the moment and on the
task of choosing words to express them adequately. Once I have
the words in mind, and have elected to write them down, the writing
itself is ‘automatic.’
The crux of the matter, if we generalize, is that we can take account
of something without necessarily focusing our attention on it. That
we, we can recognize it, and respond to it, without directing our
attention to what we are doing, and our response can be
intelligently adaptive rather than merely a reflect or habit
automatism.(Fingarette, 1998: 291)
To function in this world, we must be able to take account of data that we do
not focus our attention on. What we learn in learning to write is to write without
attending to the way we hold our pen or place our paper, or the manner in
which we shape the letters. We can write without paying any attention to such
things, even though there is a sense in which we are aware of them, and can
make appropriate adaptations if necessary. Attention is always selective; we
cannot attend to everything. And self-deception is a matter of motivated
selective attention. When we deceive ourselves we turn our attention away
from unwelcome information and fail to attend to it. We can nevertheless take
some account of that information, which, of course, is one of things that
enables us to turn our attention away from it. We deceive ourselves when we
ignore, that is, fail to attend to, information which is unwelcome to us because it
is emotionally painful or traumatic. Fingarette says:
Suppose, for example, that I have done something shameful. I take
account of my conduct and its significance for me. However, just
because this particular shame is deeply wounding to me, given my
sense of self, I avoid focusing my attention on the event, or at least
on its shameful features. I thus damp down the effect on me and
avoid a traumatic wound to my self-esteem. There is a price. I lose
the opportunity to appraise the conduct with the clarity and depth
that are afforded by close attention. I also have less reliable recall,
and can thus more readily rationalize what happened and what I
have done about it. For all these reasons, I cannot deal with the
matter as effectively as I otherwise might. I shall be less creative
and less subtle about handling the matter, tending to reach into my
past for evasive techniques already worked our. This may not be
the wisest policy in the long run, but, being all too human, we
sometimes do such things because of fear in the short run.
(Fingarette, 1998: 295)

We are aware that certain acts are shameful and can use that awareness to
take account of the acts as we wish to, which often means turning our attention
away from them, not attending either to what we did or to our feelings about it.
This combination of unfocused, but nevertheless intelligent, awareness and
lack of attention is not especially mysterious, Fingarette argues, because such
a combination is absolutely characteristic of the way in which we function in the
world. When we deceive ourselves in this way, we are doing nothing different in
kind from what we do when we take account of, but do not attend to, the way in
which our fingers are holding a pen. What is distinctive about self-deception is
that our motive is to protect ourselves from unwelcome or painful information
that we do not wish to acknowledge.
It is worth noting that self-deception is not something done by the self alone.
We are enabled to deceive ourselves because others refrain from bringing
unpleasant truths home to us. Self-deception is often the result of collusion or
complicity among people. Groups may be said to deceive themselves when
their members generally deny, avoid, or ignore unpleasant aspects of their
histories. In a recent article on the vital art of ignoring, Annette Baier says:
These phenomena, of sensible selective attention, of selective
recall, of imperfect record keeping or cover-up of our own past
selective control, are normal human phenomenology, both for
individuals and for groups. Nations attend to some calls on their
attention more than to others, write selective histories, and rewrite
them as establishments and ideologies change. Also, social
mechanisms of many kinds assist individuals in their individual selfdeceptive activities, especially when these are coordinated with
the maintenance of the preferred collective memory, that is needed
for a group’s current self-esteem. War veterans’ memories of what
slaughter they participated in or witnessed may be uncomfortable
memories both for them personally and for the national record.
Psychiatric services help soothe and play down such memories as
could be disruptive. In a free nation, the press, the film industry, and
the book trade can serve as important curbs on this smoothing
over of the blemishes on our shared past, can serve to revive
uncomfortable memories and to stir up painful awareness of what
we would understandably prefer to forget, or to continue to ignore.
(Baier 1998: 55-56)
Both as individuals and as groups, we may choose to ignore certain
unpleasant things that we would rather not acknowledge, because we do not
welcome them as aspects of our identity.
The phenomenon of ignoring is of considerable interest. We cannot ignore
something unless we have some awareness of it. Consider, for example, the
case of the cobwebs above my dining room light. To ignore them, I have to
know they are there. I may notice them while I am cleaning and decide to
ignore them because I cannot easily reach them. If I did not notice them at all,

did not see them, had no awareness of them, I could not ignore them. By
definition, we do not pay attention to what we ignore, but necessarily, we have
to have some awareness of something in order to ignore it. If I continue to
ignore the cobwebs, I will not notice when they grow, or attract dust or entrap
small flies. Then as an effect of my ignoring them, there will be many things I will
not know about them. However, in order to ignore them, I do have to know that
they exist. Eventually, they may grow so large that I can no longer ignore them
and have to stand on a chair to sweep them away.
There are more serious cases, as is suggested by the common expression
"ignore this at your peril." Consider, for instance, the man who "decided to
ignore" his doctor’s diagnosis of adult-onset diabetes and the prescription of
diet, exercise, and medication that went along with that diagnosis. He was told
he had this problem of glucose intolerance, told what to do about it, and
warned of the complications that might arise if he did nothing about it. He could
be said to know he had this problem because he had been given this
diagnosis by a reliable authority, one which he himself had been willing to
regard as reliable in the past. Yet he ignored this advice and did not
acknowledge that he was a diabetic, because he did not want to fundamentally
alter his lifestyle and monitor his blood sugar levels. Because he ignored the
advice, there was much that he did not know -- whether those levels were
higher in the morning than the evening, raised by eating ice cream,
dangerously high, or normal or low, for instance. He did not know that the
tingling in his hands and feet and the itchiness of his skin were side-effects of
his diabetes. Eventually, he experienced serious circulatory problems,
developed sores which would not heal, and had to have his feet amputated. At
that point, it was of course impossible to ignore the diabetes any longer. A sad
story -- yet true.
If things go wrong, we can protest, "but we did not know," a protestation which
will be in some sense true but at a more fundamental level deeply misleading. It
is not only phenomena and conditions that we can ignore. We can ignore
people: their claims, their protestations, their feelings, and their very existence.
Probably we have all experienced the frustration of having our requests or
appeals simply ignored. People may ignore requests rather than refusing
them, hoping in this way to avoid conflict. It is a poor strategy, for to be ignored,
not to be acknowledged at all, is more insulting than to be politely refused.
There are many things we quite properly fail to attend to – the colour of a
colleague’s shirt, the small cobweb in the corner, the mailman’s jacket, the size
of the pages of a book. Such things are in most contexts not important, there is
no need for us to notice them or attend to them, and we typically do not do so.
Should we notice such things and decide to ignore them, no harm would be
done. We cannot attend to everything. As Annette Baier points out, in order to
attend to some things, we must fail to notice, or ignore, others. What sorts of
things should we attend to? What sorts of things can we properly ignore?
These are very large questions which I pose but make no pretense to answer.
When we say of something that is not attended to that it is ignored, we are

already suggesting that it is the kind of thing that very well might have been
attended to. What we ignore is something we notice and pay no further
attention to, though we quite well might have paid further attention to it.
Suppose I get a red patch on my leg; I notice it, but decide to ignore it, paying
no further attention to it. If it grows, I may have trouble ignoring it. If it spreads
over my entire leg and the texture of my skin changes, and my skin begins to
itch, I am likely to find this condition impossible to ignore. It makes sense, and
seems appropriate, to speak of my ignoring this condition of my body,
because the domain of my own bodily condition and health is one in which I am
expected to take responsibility.
We cannot pay attention to everything. To concentrate on one thing, or on
some range of things, we must ignore many others. In our selective attention
we implicitly distinguish between those things that matter to us and those that
do not. It is most imprudent to ignore one’s irritability, alcoholism, worsening
skin condition or a doctor’s diagnosis of diabetes. However in most
circumstances, if a person chooses to ignore the fact that a pocketbook has
unusually small pages, or a friend has a long nose, the matter is of little import.
Sometimes it is even a duty to ignore certain information, as in situations
where we occupy a role that requires impartiality. (I know a job applicant is the
cousin of my brother-in-law but I ignore that relationship in judging his
application.) To ignore information or phenomena can be perfectly all right, it
can be neutral, it can be a duty, or it can be culpable. We speak of culpable
ignorance: we might also speak of culpable ignoring. We are correctly said to
culpably ignore things if we ignore things we should have, and could have,
paid attention to. We may have consciously decided to ignore these things or
we may just have come to ignore them. Of course, to say this is not to answer
the very general question of what we should pay attention to, granting that we
cannot attend to everything.
Questions of denial, ignoring, self-deception or, by contrast, acknowledgement
gain special importance when it is wounded or damaged other people, in our
own society or community, who are the objects of our attention or inattention.
When an issue is one of the suffering, pain, or need of another human being,
then, we should not generally ignore it. Yet we are very often inclined to do so,
because knowledge of the pain and suffering of others is not pleasant,
especially not in case where we bear some responsibility for it and may have
some responsibility to respond. We may ignore the appeals and protestations
of those who have been deeply hurt and wronged. We may fail to listen and
thus fail to hear and understand. We may become so oblivious to cries and
protestations that we treat people as if they barely existed at all. If so, we are
by our lack of acknowledgement negating them as people. Many South African
whites did this with regard to the black people who were their workers and
servants. Many Canadians non-natives have done this with regard to the
situation of aboriginal peoples in our country. We have chosen to ignore many
facts, problems, and cries of pain. As a result of our ignoring we know little.
Then, if we are charged with responsibility, we protest that we do not know. But
we did know something – enough to ignore the situation in the first place, to

avoid paying attention to it. We knew enough to know we did not want to know
more. We did not know because we did not want to know. We did not want to
know because the truths we would face would be unpleasant and incompatible
with our favoured pictures of ourselves, and they imply a need for restitution
and redress, threatening our rather comfortable way of life.
I make no pretense here to offer a general theory of what we should pay
attention to and what it would be culpable to ignore. But I maintain that we
should pay attention to the sorry condition of native peoples in our country, the
wrongs that have been done to them in the past, our collective responsibility for
those wrongs, the appeals of native peoples for justice, restitution, and
redress, and the practicalities and politics of policies that could offer redress.
Why? Why do I believe that these are things we should attend to, that our habit
of ignoring them is culpable ignoring, leading us to a condition of culpable
ignorance? Because these are human beings in pain and in need – human
beings in our society and nation. Because, through patterns of colonization,
land use, racism, disregard for treaties, and the residential school system, we
are linked significantly to the institutions that are responsible for their pain and
need. Because we are in many significant ways beneficiaries of the injustices
done against them. Because collectively, we have the power to improve their
situation. In these circumstances, we should acknowledge the relevant facts
and the feelings of native peoples. We cannot help but notice injured peoples,
poverty, imprisonment, and court cases about treaties, land claims, and
residential schools. Having noticed such phenomena, we should not proceed
to ignore them. To do so would be imprudent: if unacknowledged and
unaddressed, the pain, anger, and frustration of native peoples are likely to
worsen and culminate in violence. To do so would also be immoral: we have
morally significant bonds with all other human beings, but to these, our
countrymen and women, unjustly injured and deprived, most especially.
In cases of past wrongs, there is much to be acknowledged. That those
wronged are human beings with human dignity and moral worth. That these
things did happen and were wrong. That the people in question deserved
better. That their feelings of hurt, anger, or resentment are natural and
legitimate. That those who harmed them or who have been complicit in these
harms should feel guilt and shame about such things. And, very significantly,
such acknowledgement carries with it an implied commitment that these and
similar wrongs should not be perpetrated again.
The 1996 report on aboriginal issues recommended that Canadian
governments and the non-native public grant acknowledgement of past wrongs
to native Canadians, who would then receive that acknowledgement. It is useful
to distinguish between granted acknowledgement and received
acknowledgement. Before granting acknowledgement to others, one must
admit or acknowledge the aspect in question to oneself. In many cases this is
the crucial step. It is acknowledgement to oneself that is missing in the case of
self-deception. It is unwillingness to acknowledge to oneself that is implicit in

the decision to ignore. And it is acknowledgement to oneself that is
presupposed by acknowledgement to others. Received acknowledgement
presupposes granted acknowledgement, and granted acknowledgement
presupposes self-acknowledgement. Self-acknowledgement is often painful
and is by no means to be taken for granted. We human beings are often
unwilling to acknowledge various things about ourselves – our age, state of
health, failures, emotions, and wrongdoing. On a personal level,
acknowledgement can be difficult and self-deception profoundly tempting. It is
hard, and unpleasant, to acknowledge that one is a diabetic or an alcoholic, or
an unsuccessful author or parent. The same may be said on a collective level. It
is not pleasant to acknowledge that our country is founded on an unjust and
manipulative expropriation of land or that our previous governments were
committed to a policy of assimilation founded on a deeply entrenched sense of
European superiority. Nor is it pleasant to acknowledge that officials of those
very governments ignored reports of brutality, malnutrition, beating, and sexual
abuse in native residential schools under their jurisdictions because they were
racists who deemed native children to be of little value. We would rather deny,
avoid, or ignore such unpleasant aspects of our national history, turning our
attention away from studies, reports, and living victims and descendants that
point us to them. We would rather not acknowledge such things. The facts are
appalling and depressing and we would prefer not to publicize them, not to
dwell on them, not to think about them. We would rather ignore these
unpleasant facts and not come to know more. And generally, that is what we
do.
Collective diversions of attention and memory may fairly be said to amount to
collective self-deception. It would be an understatement to say that this
phenomenon is significant in politics and the aftermath of war, genocide,
colonialism, and abuse. After World War II, few Germans were willing to
acknowledge having supported Nazism in any way and the effects of this
general failure to acknowledge are still being debated. After the unification of
Germany, few of the many thousands of East Germans who had been spies for
the secret police were willing to acknowledge any wrongdoing in having done
so. After apartheid, most white South Africans were unwilling to acknowledge
that they had played some role in supporting a regime that was profoundly and
fundamentally unjust and brought great harm to black South Africans. In
Canada, relatively few non-aboriginal Canadians have been willing to
acknowledge that we have condoned and thereby helped to sustain a society
in which most native Canadians are victims of past and present ill-treatment,
injustice and poverty.
In the light of such virtually ubiquitous phenomena, the clarification of
acknowledgement seems to me to be a matter of considerable political and
ethical importance. Calls for acknowledgement have a certain misleading
vagueness and suggestion of passivity which encourage us to gloss over a
basic logical fact that in order for acknowledgement to be received, it must be
granted. In the context of victims of wrongdoing this means that perpetrators or
significantly affiliated groups will have to acknowledge wrongdoing and their

responsibility or complicity in it. They – and this often means we -- will have to
admit and avow past wrongdoing and accept that it is part of their or our own
past. They or we accept some responsibility for it. Doing so is likely to involve
entail painful self-analysis. We will have to overcome our refusal to reflect on
unpleasant truths. Both as individuals and as a society, we may have to
struggle to overcome collective denial, avoidance, ignoring, ignorance, and
self-deception. Being irritable, or a diabetic, or an alcoholic, or hard of hearing,
or a participant in a system or regime of discrimination, racism, abuse,
apartheid, or genocide are negative things. We would rather not accept such
things as aspects of ourselves or of groups with which we identify. We are
seriously tempted to ignore them, to disavow them. It is in such cases that the
question of acknowledging or avowing arises.
As human beings with an intense emotional investment in our ‘face’ and public
image, we may think of acknowledging as something that will benefit others at
a cost to ourselves, in image, status, and reputation. To looking at
acknowledgement in this way is likely to strengthen our sense that we do not
want to acknowledge. It is likely to heighten the temptations of ignoring, denial
and self-deception, especially in cases where we have been responsible for
wrongdoing and a moral apology would be an appropriate form of
acknowledgement.
I would argue that self-acknowledgement and granting acknowledgement are
at a deeper level beneficial to us -- even when what we admit is something we
would rather not identify with ourselves. The man who chose to ignore his
diabetes and eventually lost his feet would have benefited by acknowledging
that he had this disorder and altering his lifestyle accordingly. I believe that we
who have shared responsibility for wrongdoing will benefit if we acknowledge
that wrongdoing and our shared responsibility for it. In the final analysis, we
ourselves will be better off morally and politically if we acknowledge that there
has been injustice, that we bear some responsibility for it, and that efforts in the
direction of restitution are required. Only if we acknowledge can we properly
manage respond to the hurts and needs of victims and deal with our feelings of
guilt and shame.
The expectation of the 1996 report is that native Canadians would benefit in
fundamental ways if federal and provincial governments and the broader
Canadian public were to acknowledge a great range of wrongdoing and a
deep injustice at the very foundation of our society. For that acknowledgement
to be received by native Canadians it must be granted by some person or
persons. For it to be granted, we must grant it. We must to ourselves and each
other acknowledge that people who were and are in some important sense
our people, in some sense WE, were responsible for serious wrongdoing and
injustice. The effects of that injustice persist to this day. They are reflected in
the attitudes and the conditions of marginalized and traumatized people. To
grant acknowledgement to native peoples, we will have to admit to ourselves
(and publicly) some unwelcome truths. One example is the absurdity of the still
often-cited idea that Canada has two founding nations, French and English. In

the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries, Canada was not a terra
nullius, an empty land awaiting settlement by European peoples. Native
peoples were already here and at great sacrifice and under some unfair
pressure and manipulation signed treaties that made available the land on
which our present country was built.
3. Further Points.
Acknowledgement is knowledge plus a kind of marking or spelling out or
admitting as significantly related to oneself, of something that is known. Thus
acknowledgement requires truth. When we acknowledge, we attend to some
reality. To say that we should acknowledge native history and culture is to imply
that there exist native history and culture to attend to. The connection between
acknowledgement and truth means that some calls for acknowledgement are
contestable. Consider, for example, the case of white supremacists who
demand acknowledgement of their ‘victimization’ by brown and black
interlopers who should not be living in North America and fail to acknowledge
the superiority of the white race. Few would accept their claims as legitimate.
The possibility of contestable claims to acknowledgement is by no means
trivial in the context of wrongdoing. A man may call for his acknowledgement
as a wounded victim, a freedom fighter who was in the course of his just
struggle against apartheid, wrongly tortured by the state police. At the same
time his torturer may insist that he was interrogated as part of a necessary
campaign against terrorist forces paid by international communist groups.
Acknowledgement may be complete or partial. One may acknowledge that
victims received less than they deserved, but insist that what happened was
not wrongdoing, rather an honest error, or well-intended attempt to act under
principles of another time. In this case one would partially acknowledge
wrongdoing. We may also distinguish between implicit and explicit
acknowledgement. All acknowledgement is a marking or spelling out, a noting.
Yet not all acknowledgement is verbally explicit. A person may explicitly
acknowledge one thing, thereby suggesting or strongly implying that he has
noted something else. In this sense, he may be said to implicitly acknowledge
the second thing. For example, if a truth commission in its proceedings
explicitly acknowledges that a group was adversely affected, both
economically and culturally, by an unjust and compelled relocation, it will have
implicitly acknowledged that the surviving members that group have at least a
prima facie claim to compensation for costs imposed on them.
Many cases of partial or implicit acknowledgement are in effect cases of
compromised acknowledgement. In compromised acknowledgement, the one
who offers acknowledgement expresses a mixed message in which there are
both elements of acknowledgement and elements of denial. The contradictions
and denials of systems such as anti-Semitism, racism, colonialism, and
sexism are legendary. In eighteenth century Europe, women were widely
regarded as silly, irresponsible, and irrational; yet they were also the life
partners for allegedly rational and responsible men, and the hurturers of

children. Slaves were regarded as sub-human, and yet owners took care to
convert them to Christianity. South African blacks were supposed primitive
peoples who did not share the feelings and capacity for education that whites
had. Yet they were charted with responsible tasks such as caring for children.
Human beings deemed scum or vermin were used for medical
experimentation that presupposed their relevant similarity to those other human
beings who had denied them human status. Compromised acknowledgement
is both common and hurtful. It is common because in many situations of lack of
acknowledgement there is, after all, knowledge which will come to the fore. Yet
there are disincentives to publicly admitting or avowing that knowledge, so
contrary factors are also likely to come to the fore. Thus, a mixed message is
given. To someone who has been unjustly treated and is seeking
acknowledgement, the mixed message is likely to be confusing and hurtful.
In many cases of compromised acknowledgement, hopes are raised and then
dashed. Speaking of the wounds from historical wrongs, some have alluded to
the "second wound of silence." The second wound is the hurt to victims of
ignoring what was done to them; to ignore the wrong is to imply that it, and the
resulting suffering, do not really matter. Truly this is adding the wound of insult
to the wound of injury. Acknowledgement by relevant individuals and institutions
can heal the second wound of silence. Following on the metaphor of the
second wound, we may think of the third wound as a kind of insincerity. This is
the wound of an insincere or partial apology, or some other form of
compromised acknowledgement.
Because what is ignored in such cases are obvious facts, we are likely to
imply some recognition or acknowledgement of those facts in what we say and
do. But because complete acknowledgement of those obvious facts would be
unpleasant and imply the need for unwelcome change, we are likely to give
only partial acknowledgement and in fact to implicitly deny recognition of those
facts. Thus we offer compromised acknowledgement.
Having noted these distinctions, I shall not deal further here with partial, implicit,
or compromised acknowledgement. Rather, I shall discuss the importance of
acknowledgement on the assumption that what is in question is explicit and
complete acknowledgement. What makes explicit and complete
acknowledgement important argues especially against compromised
acknowledgement, which conveys a conflicting and hurtful message.
4. Exploring Claims about Acknowledgement
In the reports of the South African TRC and the 1996 Commission on
Aboriginal Issues, there is a commitment to the idea that acknowledgment has
an important role to play in the healing of victims of wrongdoing and in
prospects for their peaceful and productive coexistence with perpetrators,
perpetrator groups, bystanders, and beneficiaries. Both reports endorse
acknowledgement as fundamental for healing and a step towards any deep
reconciliation between groups. Given the logical relationships between
received acknowledgement, granted acknowledgement, and self-

acknowledgement, it is reasonable to interpret both reports as claiming that
perpetrators and beneficiaries should grant acknowledgement so that those
wronged can receive it. One form of acknowledging wrongdoing is through
moral apologies, in which perpetrators or those institutionally allied to them
admit responsibility for doing something wrong.
The implicit theory here seems to be that wrongs of the past should be
acknowledged by perpetrators and their affiliates, because acknowledging
those wrongs will assist victims to heal, will mark a separation from the
wrongdoing of the past and a commitment to reform, and may constitute a
first step towards reconciliation. Perpetrators, or the state, or both will grant
acknowledgement to victims, who will then receive acknowledgement of their
human dignity and worth and the wrongfulness of what was done to them.
Acknowledgement articulates a recognition that certain sorts of acts were
wrong and a commitment not to do such things again. As such it is not only
beneficial to victims, but has a role in the reform of perpetrators and the moral
advance of society. Acknowledgement may be expressed in various ways:
through criminal trials, truth commissions, public inquiries, apologies,
reparations, or memorials.
First, let us consider the phenomenon of acknowledgement from the point of
view of victims of serious wrongdoing. I would like to appeal to a view
articulated by Jean Hampton, who said that wrongdoing of this sort expresses
a message of lack of moral worth, because the victims is treated as though
they simply do not count. To forcibly evict a community from its land without
obtaining its informed consent and making reasonable arrangements for its
wellbeing, so that other people can live there or develop resources there, or
test their planes there, is to imply that that community, and the people who
constitute it, simply do not matter, that their needs and wishes, indeed their
very moral dignity and status as human beings, need not be taken into
account. Such treatment might be said to negate them as human beings. To
treat them with such cruelty is to treat them as negligible, to assume and imply
that they have no dignity or moral worth, which is an especially radical and
fundamental way of denying their human rights. In cases when wrongdoing has
implied such radical denial of moral status, acknowledgement that what was
done was wrong and these people deserved better is powerful and important
because it negates that wrongful message of moral insignificance. Instead, the
acknowledgement of wrongdoing communicates a recognition of the human
dignity and worth of the victim.
Those who have been victims of wrongdoing are likely to know it, to be painfully
aware of it, and to still suffer after-effects. When perpetrators or their affiliates,
or society at large, fail to acknowledge that wrongdoing, the initial wound
develops into "the second wound of silence" because there is further evidence
that people do not care. Silent and unrepentant perpetrators or perpetrator
groups give no evidence of renouncing their actions or the message of
worthlessness that went with it. Friends and associates, society at large,
neglect even to discuss the wrong, conveying the message that it is of slight

importance and by implication, those hurt do not matter. To receive
acknowledgement that these things did happen, that they were wrong and
should not have happened, and that those to whom they happened were
human beings with human rights, persons possessing the same dignity and
worth that belong to other human beings, is to receive confirmation, validation,
of one’s dignity and status as a human being, and a moral being of equal
worth. For profound wrongs, that is the primary and basic reason that
acknowledgement is important to victims. It should be obvious that any human
being is a human being, that a woman or black or native is a human being just
as much as a white middle class man, and that whatever grounds rights,
responsibilities and privileges for white men grounds them for other human
beings too. I believe that such things are "obvious." But although they are
obvious, we have often acted as though they were false. We have ignored this
fundamental metaphysical and moral truth about human beings. And in
situations where that fundamental truth has been ignored, often with the result
of tremendous suffering and pain, we should, in effect, acknowledge it, marking
it, indicating our commitment to it.
At the Truth Commission in South Africa, thousands of people who had been
deemed of little worth under the apartheid system were respectfully heard as
they told their own stories of suffering before a respectful state commission.
Their stories were written into the history of the nation that had under apartheid
sought to undermine their human dignity and denied their status as citizens.
Such acknowledgement matters to victims because it is a recognition of their
status as full-fledged persons and citizens, and a rejection of past practice
founded on the contrary view. The 1996 Canadian report suggested a similar
commission at which native Canadians could appear and tell their stories so
that their full moral status, suffering, and role in our history would be
acknowledged.
Of course not all wrongdoing is so fundamental that the very moral status of the
victim is cast in question. Sometimes the issue is a much less fundamental, but
still real, failure of recognition of activities and attainments. People
unacknowledged in such ways may feel humiliated not because they feel that
they are rejected as less-than-human but because they feel that in ignoring
their attainments and activities, others are implicitly ignoring what they have
done with their lives, what is for them an utterly central feature of their lives.
When someone is persistently treated as second-class and used for the
convenience of others, when many of her activities, achievements, and
attainments are ignored or acknowledged only in a partial or compromised
way, she is likely to be harmed by this lack of acknowledgement. It would be an
exaggeration to say that her moral dignity or personhood has thereby been
denied. But something fundamental to her, what she has done with much of her
life, how she has thought and deliberated and directed and focused her
energies, is treated as though it is nothing. This may be said of much
household work, to which so many millions of women have devoted large parts
of their lives.

Acknowledgement of an implicit, but unarticulated wrong, offers the hope of
ending an awkward separation and alienation between people. It soothes the
injured one, ends his or her frustration, putting him or her at ease and
terminating a fundamental lack of ease, discomfort, hurt, and misery. When an
aspect of a person that she considers to be fundamental to her life and identity
is unacknowledged by others, that person will feel frustrated, confused in her
identity, and in central regards alienated from those others. She cannot be to
them what she takes herself to be, because they ignore or deny those aspects
of herself. Acknowledgement will bring relief and a soothing, a relaxation and
ease within herself. It is as though a barrier between herself and these others
has been removed.
Are there not counter-examples to the claim that human beings will thrive only
if, and only when, their moral status and significant accomplishments are
acknowledged by others? During his many years in prison, Nelson Mandela
never lost his dignity, his capacity for leadership, his style of respectful
interaction with others, or his sense of himself as a human being with human
rights. When he was treated badly, he was not undermined. When he worked
long hours in a quarry, when he had been beaten and had to labor under an
uncomfortable sun, he retained the sense that he and his country had a better
future. Stories of such courage and conviction show that it is possible to
maintain one’s sense of self under very severe conditions. Clearly we must
allow that such people can manage in this world without acknowledgement.
And many do, of course. There are the heroes, the brave ones, like Nelson
Mandela and political prisoners around the world. But still, acknowledgement is
important as recognition, as an acceptance of who we are, as we think we are,
by others. A precious few among us can preserve that fundamental of selfworth, self-trust, and self-respect in the face of external denial and
obliviousness. But that is not to deny the general importance of
acknowledgement. Most of us do not do well preserving a sense of who we are
and what we do in a context that denies or ignores the value of these things.
Where they have been denied or ignored, acknowledgement removes a
barrier between self and others, a confirmation of who one is and what one has
lived through.
The self is not an entirely individual thing. It is often said that the self is socially
constructed. I take this to mean that we do not establish our personal identity
and sense of meaning and purpose in life by ourselves. We acquire language,
beliefs, knowledge, and skills from other people. We gain much of our
knowledge from the testimony of other people, either verbally or in print or other
media. Our memories, beliefs, attitudes, interpretations, emotions,
motivations, and goals emerge from our experience interacting with other
people and are strongly affected by the cultural context in which we live. We
speak to and with other people, who may choose whether to listen to us or not,
and interpret what we say in various ways, as they will. The roles we occupy in
life – mother, volunteer, teacher,, author, philosopher, activist – are social roles
that deeply affect us but are clearly established apart from our own individual
efforts. Those roles affect the very structure of our time and our lives, and our

capacity to act. From the theory that the self is in such ways socially
constructed, we can derive an explanation of why acknowledgement is
important to the one who receives it. We are not able to establish alone our
sense of who we are, what defines us, and what we have done and are doing
in this world by ourselves. Others establish that sense of self with us. If those
others deny or ignore what we find crucial to ourselves, we will experience
have serious tension, affecting our fundamental sense of who we are. If others
treat us as morally negligible or as people whose activities and attainments
are to be ignored or denied, our own sense of self and meaning will be
contradicted, resulting in tension, alienation, and suspicion. Acknowledgement
offers soothing, relief, and a basis for open, comfortable, and more trusting
relationships. This is part of the story as to why acknowledgement is important.
For victims of serious wrongdoing, to receive acknowledgement is soothing,
healing and supportive. It contributes to their restoration and healing which are
necessary for their full functioning in society. That in itself is a reason for others
– especially perpetrators and affiliated groups – to acknowledge them. If we
accept some moral responsibility for the wellbeing of other people, we should
accept an obligation to acknowledge them with regard to their claim to decent
moral treatment (relevant to the case of serious wrongdoing) and their worthy
and purposeful activities in life. Thus, there are reasons to grant
acknowledgement that come from the needs of people who have been
wronged to receive acknowledgement.
But this is by no means the end of the story. In the case of wrongdoing, those
who have been complicit in, or agents of, serious wrongdoing are likely to
know that they have done so and to feel guilt and shame about the matter. In
failing to acknowledge the wrongdoing and their individual or shared
responsibility for it, they are almost certainly denying or ignoring those feelings
in themselves. Those feelings exist, as is evidenced by the fact that they are
felt on certain occasions. For example, many Canadians who ignore the
situation of aboriginal people most of the time and would acknowledge little or
no complicity in the exploitation and abuse that have caused it feel deeply
uneasy if approached by native persons asking for food or money. That
circumstance elicits the guilt, shame, and embarrassment that we feel "deep
down," even while we are far too often content to deny or ignore many claims of
native peoples. To acknowledge the humanity and dignity of these people, the
wrongs that have been done to them through Canadian history, and our own
complicity in tolerating the persistent marginalization that has resulted from
those wrongs is at the same time to acknowledge feelings of guilt and shame
in ourselves. Only if we acknowledge those feelings and the facts about our
own history and circumstances can we begin to address and resolve this guilt
and shame. To feel guilt and shame is quite appropriate, because these
negative emotions should inspire reflection and commitment to further
knowledge and action. Our acknowledgement is the first step toward moral
reform.
We know that most natives live in extremely poor socio-economic conditions.

We know that alcoholism, substance abuse, family violence, and suicide are
rampant on native reserves. We know that native concerns are easily lost in
Canada’s political agenda, where Quebec demands tend to predominate. But
we tend in our daily lives and even in our political life to deny or ignore them or
to deceive ourselves about their significance. The 1996 Report calls for us to
do more than know these things. It calls for us to acknowledge them, to accept
them as part of who we are as a people and a country. Why should we do this?
Why would this be important? Because we owe it to these people who are our
brothers and sisters and from whom we received our land. Because in so
doing, we can address and deal with our own feelings of guilt and shame. And
fundamentally, because such acknowledgement is a necessary first step in the
direction of moral and political reform. If we are not willing to publicly mark
these facts, to publicly acknowledge the exploitation and injustice that have
characterized native-government and native-white relations in this country for
the last two centuries, we will have no hope of improving from our past. That is
why acknowledgement is important.
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